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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Money Had and Received-Recovery by Hospital of
Damages Paid for Medical Expense
In two recent North Carolina and South Carolina cases, inter-
-esting divergence of opinion is apparent as to the scope of the action
of money had and received. In the North Carolina case,' plaintiff
hospital, in a suit against an infant for treatment of his injuries re-
.ceived in an accident, was allowed recovery not only in quantum
mruit for necessaries, but for money had and received from a judg-
ment against the original wrongdoer which included the hospital
expense as an item of damage. The South Carolina court2 held, on
the other hand, that where an injured man had recovered damages
from his tort-feasor in a suit in which he alleged hospital expenses
as a material factor of his injury, the money so recovered was not
impressed with a trust in favor of his physician.
Although the result reached by the North Carolina court is sound,
it is submitted that this should have been based solely upon the in-
fant's liability for necessaries supplied him,3 and that the South Caro-
lina court correctly held that there was no trust set up in favor of
the physician. The doctrine of money had and received has been so
loosely applied that it is difficult to determine just when the action
will lie.4 Generally, however, it would seem that the action should
be allowed only where the plaintiff can show that money, rightfully
his, has been paid to the defendant either expressly for the use of
the plaintiff, or where it can be shown that the defendant has ob-
tained the plaintiff's money through mistake of fact, fraud, or duress.5
'Cole v. Wagner, 197 N. C. 692, 150 S. E. 339 (1929).
'Traywick v. Wannamaker, 150 S. E. 655 (S. C. 1929).
Richardson v. Strong, 35 N. C. 106 (1851); McAlpine v. Dzwonkiewicz,
231 Mich. 165, 203 N. W. 671 (1925) (the facts of this case square exactly
with the North Carolina case under discussion. The court allowed a full re-
covery on the liability of the infant's estate for necessaries) ; Harris v.
Crawley, 161 Mich. 383, 126 N. W. 421 (1910) ; O'Donnelly v. Kinley, 220 Mo.
App. 284, 286 S. W. 140 (1926) ; Gibbs v. Poplar Bluff Light and Power Com-
pany, 142 Mo. App. 19, 125 S. W. 840 (1910); Note (1924) 32 A. L. R. 659.
Contra: Hoyt v. Casey, 114 Mass. 397, 19 Am. Rep. 371 (1873); Wailing v.
Toll, 9 Johns 141 (N. Y. 1812).
" Holt v. Markham, 92 L. J. K. B. 406, [1923] 1 K. B. 504. (In his opinion
in this case Scrutton, L. J. says: "The whole history of this particular form
of action (money had and received) has been what I may call a history of
well meaning sloppiness of thought"); Hanbury, The Recovery of Money
(1924) 40 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 31.
'Christie v. Durden, 205 Ala. 571, 88 So. 667 (1921) ; Dimmitt v. Johnson,
199 Iowa 966, 203 N. W. 261 (1925) ; Gloyd v. Hotel La Salle, 221 Ill. App.
104 (1921) ; Ambrose v. Graziani, 197 Ky. 679, 247 S. W. 953 (1923) ; Cutler
v. Rand, 8 Cush. 89 (Mass. 1883) ; Bither v. Packard, 115 Me. 306, 98 Atl. 929
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But the North Carolina case seems to be the first suggestion that an
action for money had and received might be allowed when all plain-
tiff could show was a debt due him by the defendant and the receipt
of money by the defendant from a third person that might have been
used to discharge that debt. Obviously there was no question of
mistake, fraud, or duress involved.
As to the remaining question, whether the money was paid to the
defendant for the plaintiff, it seems clear that such was not the case
despite the argument that since the present defendant as plaintiff in
the prior case alleged hospital expense as an element of damage, he
rceived that part of the damages for the plaintiff. The injured per-
son in setting up hospital expenses in his suit against the tort-feasor
did so merely for the purpose of enabling the jury to use this ele-
ment, along with others such as suffering and impairment of earning
capacity, in measuring the total compensation due him for his in-
juries, 6 and as the South Carolina court correctly held, not as an
attempt to set himself up as trustee of a fund to the use of the hos-
pital or physician. Nor did the tort-feasor have any interest or
motive to require that any part of the money paid on the judgment
be devoted to the payment of the hospital, for he was not liable to
the hospital.
It would seem, therefore, that the effect of this part of the de-
cision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is to extend unneces-
sarily the application of the over-stretched doctrine 7 of money had
and received.
A. W. LANGSTON.
(1916) ; Reddingius v. Enkema, 156 Minn. 283. 194 N. W. 646 (1923) ; Smith
v. Hicks, 1 Wend. 202 (N. Y. 1829) ; Gochenauer v. Gard, 3 Penr. & W. 274
(Pa. 1831); City of Norfolk v. Norfolk County, 129 Va. 356, 91 S. E. 82a
(1917); Sinclair v. Brougham, 1914 A. C. 398; Banque Beige v. Hambrouck
(1921) 1 K. B. 321; Skelly v. Solari, 9 M. & W. 54, 152 Eng. Rep. 24 (Ex.
1841) ; Marriott v. Hampton, 7 T. R. 269, 101 Eng. Rep. 969 (K. B. D. 1797);
CHrrrY's PLEADING (16th American Edition) at page 365.
6 Ledford v. The Valley River Lumber Company, 183 N. C. 614, 112 S. .
421 (1922); SEDGWIcx, ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES (2nd. ed. 1909) at pages 11
and 158.
'Rabinowitz v. People's National Bank, 235 Mass. 102, 126 N. E. 289 (1920)
(holding that the right to recover in an action for money had and received
depends upon the obligation to restore that which the law implies should be
returned where one has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another).
Where money is received to a debtors' own use not even a prior assignee can
recover it in an action for money had and received.
